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Fortunes of feminism: Act four 
By JO LITTLER 
 
Fortunes of Feminism collects together some of Nancy Fraser’s writing on gender over a 
twenty-five year period, between 1985 and 2010. They are all texts which were originally 
published elsewhere, including reworked chapters from her book Justice Interruptus: Critical 
Reflections on the Postsocialist Condition, and articles published in a range of left, feminist 
and critical theory journals, including Signs, New German Critique and (in the case of several 
of the later chapters) New Left Review. Here, they are re-framed and re-staged, with 
substantial explanatory prologue, accruing extra meanings in their new assemblage. As the 
title expressively tells us, this is a ‘Drama in Three Acts’, a show charting the vicissitudes of 
feminism in the Global North between the new left and the neoliberal present. 
The acts tell the story of how a vibrant second wave feminism challenged, at the peak of 
welfarism, the masculinist/androcentric assumptions of post-war social democracy (a 
feminism seeking ‘less to dismantle the welfare state then to transform it into a force that 
could help to overcome male domination’). The second part begins to examine what happens 
to feminist imaginaries during the slow rise of neoliberalism: including a fixation on cultural 
dimensions of recognition and identity politics at the expense of economic egalitarianism. The 
third act skewers full-blown, or late stage neoliberalism, as it had -- by this time these articles 
were written -- emerged. Analysing how it draws on feminist energies to legitimate itself, and 
searching for a reinvigorated anti-capitalist feminism in response, it considers how to 
‘reactivate and extend the insurrectionary, anti-capitalist spirit of the second wave’ (Fraser, 
2013, 16).  
The arrival of the book in 2013 was invigorating and dramatic because it opened up new and 
productive ways of conceptualizing and clarifying what has been happening both to gender 
and to feminism during the period when neoliberalism became entrenched in practice in the 
Global North. Fortunes of Feminism provided a set of conceptual tools through which to 
understand the reconfiguration of gender dynamics in relation to the social and political 
transformations of Western societies. For example, it offers a schematization of how the 
movement from the single to the two-earner family model as normative ideal over the past 60 
years happened without absorbing the left feminist demand for a ‘universal caregiver’ model 
of social and economic reproduction, which would involve including both men and women in 
the public workplace, shortening the working week, and enabling both men and women to 
become equal caregivers and caretakers of children (ibidem, 111-138). Fraser’s accounts of 
the historical, social, political and economic paradigm shifts which both shape and are shaped 
by gender are remarkable in their ability to synthesise complexity, in their clarity and force, 
and in their pointing to viable alternatives: they offer a powerful lens through which to 
understand, and work to change, the gender politics of the present.  
The book and the articles constituting it were nonetheless inevitably met with disagreement 
and spawned greater discussion for many feminists. Some read them as unjustly attacking 
feminism, blaming feminism too much for neoliberal politics; or as downplaying the success 
of gender mainstreaming, or feminism’s long march through institutions (Walby, 2011). 
Others wondered whether they seriously downplayed the work of feminists who continued to 
not-be-neoliberal throughout the long rise of neoliberalism (Fraser, 2015)1. 
These issues are very important to raise. They help draw attention to the complexity of 
feminism, of what different ideologies, discourses and practices it can be articulated to; and to 
the multiplicity of its forms, as well as to the spheres in which it has made most and least 
progress. When interviewing Nancy Fraser for Soundings I asked if, in Fortunes of Feminism, 
she was primarily discussing movement, academic or mainstream media feminism, and 
whether she ever worried about minimizing the impact of non-neoliberal or socialist 
feminists. She made it clear that she was talking about a hegemonic form of feminism; and 
that these latter constituencies included herself as well as friends and «sisters and comrades. 
But I think, frankly, that we have to admit that we are not particularly influential» (Fraser, 
2015). It’s a good example of leaving your ego at the door in the service of effective political 
analysis.  
It is noticeable now that the contemporary anti-capitalist feminism (or indeed what we might 
call ‘anti-neoliberal feminism’) that was in still in its infancy when Fortunes of Feminism was 
                                                        
1 Such commentaries often linked the book together with Hester Eisenstein’s critique of neoliberal co-
option in Feminism Seduced (2009), a title implicitly figuring feminism as a more singular damsel 
than the more multifaceted Fortunes of Feminism. 
published in 2013 has grown and expanded (cf. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, the Women’s 
Strike) alongside other changes in the political landscape (Trump, neo-nationalism, regressive 
populism, the rise of new forms of socialism in mainstream politics). These issues have begun 
to be addressed in more recent work published since, and given that we are now in 2019 it is 
worth including them in this discussion, as a kind of extension of the third act of Fortunes of 
Feminism --  or, more likely, a fourth one.  
This more recent work includes an clarifying essay on the contradictions between capital and 
care for New Left Review (2016); and two short books published by Verso, first Feminism for 
the 99%: A Manifesto co-written with Cinzia Arruzza and Tithi Bhattacharya (academics 
heavily involved with organizing the Women’s Strike in the US); and second The Old Is 
Dying and the New Cannot be Born, consisting of an extended essay and an interview with 
the editor of the left US magazine Jacobin, Bhaskar Sunkara. The title of the latter book is the 
oft-used Gramsci quote on the political interregnum, and in it Fraser picks apart neoliberalism 
in an era of Trump. Arguing that ‘neoliberalism is not a total worldview […] it is a political-
economic project that can articulate with several different and even competing projects of 
recognition – including progressive ones’ (p.42) she names the two key current projects as 
‘progressive neoliberalism’ (ie, socially liberal neoliberalism) and ‘hyperreactionary 
neoliberalism’ (ie, the politics of Trump with all its attendant racism and sexism). Instead she 
argues for a progressive populism, discussing Bernie Sanders in this vein. Feminism for the 
99% is a way to contribute to such movement for progressive populism, an invigorating call 
for ‘kick-back’, rather than ‘lean in’ feminism (p.13). This is anticapitalist feminism against 
‘equal opportunity domination’; against a liberal agenda which, as they write, cannot 
effectively defeat sexism and will let the planet burn.  
We are taught as academics to pick apart the problems of other academic texts. But I have few 
problems with these works. They are so productive and helpful. Fraser’s analyses are 
important because they incisively pinpoint the political logic co-opting feminism which is 
crucial if we want to work on amplifying its more egalitarian and democratic forms. In this 
vein I was glad to see the ‘fateful’ reduction of equality to meritocracy highlighted (Fraser, 
2019, 13); for as I also have discussed elsewhere, the ideology of meritocracy, in all its  
various and shape-shifting forms, has become a key means of cultural legitimation for 
neoliberalism (Littler, 2018). One potential problem is that I fear the phrase ‘progressive 
neoliberalism’ is something of a hostage to fortune, only too easily misunderstood in an era of 
short attention spans / an oversaturated attention economy (or to put it in other terms, that it is 
not sufficiently progressively populist itself). Perhaps ‘socially liberal neoliberalism’ is less 
likely to be misunderstood, although it could also runs the risk of breeding semantic 
confusion, sounding a little as if caught in its own stuttering repetition.  
Yet the substance of the texts work effectively to parse the new formations of neoliberalism, 
of its varieties between liberalism and nationalism, the pathetic social inadequacy of the 
former amplifying and spawning the violence of the latter. Some questions remain over the 
extent to which reactionary neoliberalism is in some forms not neoliberal at all but rather 
reactionary nationalism, a new form of authoritarian populism flirting with fascism. The 
issues ‘the fourth act’ deals with are live, including trans debates and formations of 
racialization; the environmentalism is integrated more and more, as it needs to be (I write 
these words in London, in the UK, during a heatwave, in the month Chennai in India ran out 
of water; amidst the hottest planetary June temperatures ever recorded).  
These two recent short books are riding the wave of the diversification trend in publishing 
that has popularized the pithy polemic over the past ten years, cascading from Zero and 
Repeater presses into the mainstream publishers. At a time when Penguin is publishing and 
heavily promoting the right-wing stoical self-help books of Jordan Peterson – and more 
shame should be heaped on them for doing so – it is heartening to see Fraser reach out to 
extend the audience for her ideas through different forms. The vast online uptake of a 
Guardian article paraphrasing Fortunes of Feminism was a forerunner of this (in 2015 Fraser 
said that that she was astonished by the uptake of the Guardian article and regretted not being 
able to do more popular work). In attempting to reach out and mobilise through manifestos, as 
well as clarify through theory, these texts instantiate what they intellectualise, or practice 






By ERIC FASSIN 
In Fortunes of Feminism, Nancy Fraser develops an argument about second-wave feminism 
that is both historical and theoretical. While Act One is the expression of “an insurrectionary 
force,” “as utopian energies” give way to “identity politics,” Act Two marks a shift “from 
redistribution to recognition;” finally, Act Three’s Hegelian synthesis of “feminist radicalism” 
redux could define our present (Fraser, 2013, 1). While the three sections that organize this 
2013 volume correspond to these three moments, the collection of essays covers twenty-five 
years, from 1985 to 2010. As a consequence, it makes clear that Fraser’s conceptual apparatus 
has a history of its own – most visibly in the expansion of the binary model into a ternary one 
that now includes “participatory parity”, captured in the subtitle of a 2005 essay: “from 
redistribution to recognition to representation.” 
Historicizing Fraser’s thinking proves most illuminating when revisiting a famous debate that 
took place in 1997. Judith Butler then offered a critique of critics of the so-called “cultural 
Left” who complained that “the cultural focus of leftist politics has abandoned the materialist 
project of Marxism, failing to address questions of economic equity and redistribution.”  
(Butler, 1997, 265). According to her, “the charge that new social movements are ‘merely 
cultural,’ that a unified and progressive Marxism must return to a materialism based in an 
objective analysis of class, itself presumes that the distinction between material and cultural 
life is a stable one.” Has not Marxism, at least since Engels’ work on the family, always been 
both about production and reproduction (i.e. the reproduction of labor power)? Moreover, 
since Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall have grounded cultural studies in Marxist theory, 
according to Butler, such attacks are but the symptom of an “anachronistic materialism.” 
(Ibidem, p.267-268). “Merely Cultural”: the title of her essay is thus an ironic response to 
what she considers a parody of New Left concerns with minority politics. 
Two decades later, this polemic still resonates at the center of left-wing politics. In France, for 
example, Mark Lilla’s denunciation of American identity politics in the name of liberalism 
has translated into an attack on “gauche identitaire” in the name of class by historian of 
immigration and the working-class Gérard Noiriel – both converging (unexpectedly) in a 
defense of “the people” (versus “minorities”); (Lilla, 2017; Noiriel, 2018a and 2018b). This is 
an opposition between what critics of minority politics often name “societal” issues (gender 
and sexuality) and “social” ones (restricted to economic inequalities). Within this framework, 
race plays an ambiguous role: it can be considered either “social” (when reduced to class) or 
“societal” (accused of distracting from class). Such a rejection of the “cultural Left” can even 
be heard within feminism: in the name of “materialist feminism,” Christine Delphy thus 
accuses poststructuralists of idealism: “Butler never talks about material conditions or 
economic oppression. None of this exists for her. Her take on domination is purely 
ideological.” (Delphy, 2015).  
Are we doomed to this profound antagonism within the Left? Is there no alternative to the 
alternative between “materialism” and “culturalism”, post-Marxism and post-structuralism, 
class politics and minority issues? Fraser presents her advocacy of a “radical feminism” as an 
attempt to reconcile the critiques of gender and capitalist oppressions. In the same 1997 issue 
of Social Text (Fraser, 1997 and Fraser, 2013, 175-186), she therefore responded to Butler’s 
response: from Fraser’s perspective, the distinction between “recognition and distribution” 
does not provide the theoretical foundation for such a polemical opposition. Far from joining 
forces with orthodox Marxism, she “proposed a theoretical framework that eschews orthodox 
distinctions between ‘base’ and ‘superstructure,’ ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ oppressions, and 
that challenges the primacy of the economic.” The political consequence is clear: “injustices 
of misrecognition are as serious as distributive injustices.” But, for her, the fundamental 
theoretical divide remains: the former “cannot be reduced to the latter.” 
While Fraser rejects the accusation that she establishes a hierarchy of oppressions as a “red 
herring,” she still insists on maintaining a theoretical distinction: “Butler has mistaken what is 
actually a quasi-Weberian dualism of status and class for an orthodox Marxian economistic 
monism.” (Fraser 2013, 176-177). Of course, this rebuttal is not devoid of polemical barbs: by 
conflating different forms of oppression, “Butler has resurrected what is in my view one of 
the worst aspects of 1970s Marxism and socialist-feminism: the over-totalizing view of 
capitalist society as monolithic ‘system’ of interlocking structures of oppression that 
seamlessly reinforce one another.” Fraser makes a plea for “historicization” (rather than 
“deconstruction”). Butler invokes Marcel Mauss and Claude Lévi-Strauss to undermine the 
opposition between the material and the cultural; but according to Fraser, these 
anthropologists’ arguments about the “gift” and the “exchange of women” only apply to “pre-
state, precapitalist societies”. Against Butler, Fraser argues that the defining feature of 
capitalist societies is precisely the “distinction between the economic and the cultural.” 
(ibidem, 183-184). 
Reading their exchange twenty years later, in the context of Fraser’s 2013 collection of 
essays, clearly shows that the polemic is not over. Far from being purely theoretical, it 
remains deeply political – from Fraser’s own point of view. In a piece that was first presented 
in a 2008 keynote lecture, she relies on the critical analysis of the “critique artiste” (from 
Baudelaire to the 1960s) developed by Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiappello in their influential 
essay on the “the new spirit of capitalism.” Capitalism remakes itself “in part by recuperating 
strands of critique directed against it.” In particular, “the ‘new spirit’ that has served to 
legitimate the flexible neoliberal capitalism of our time was fashioned from the New Left’s 
‘artistic critique’ of state-organized capitalism.”  
According to Fraser, this is true of second-wave feminism: “Unambiguously emancipatory in 
the era of state-organized capitalism, critiques of economism, androcentrism, étatism, and 
Westphalianism now appear fraught with ambiguity, susceptible to serving the legitimation 
needs of a new form of capitalism.” The polemical intent against “Act Two” feminism is 
clear: “After all, this capitalism would much prefer to confront claims for recognition over 
claims for redistribution.” The theoretical distinction thus revives, with a historical twist, the 
political hierarchy that is at stake in the polemic between Butler and Fraser (Fraser, “Feminism, 
Capitalism, and the Cunning of History,” ibidem, 209-226; Boltanski and Chiappello, 2005, 219, 220, 
and 223). 
In order to avoid returning to such a hierarchy of oppressions, I wish to question anew the 
distinction between recognition and redistribution – not in anthropological terms, as Butler 
does, but in historical ones, following Fraser’s lead. However, today’s context is not 
capitalism in general; it is neoliberalism. Without rehashing all the important arguments that 
have been developed over the years by Butler, Fraser, and many others, I want to maintain the 
conclusion of the 2006 volume on race and class that I co-edited: “recognition is most often a 
prelude to redistribution; conversely, redistribution is usually a form of recognition.” (Fassin 
and Fassin, 2006, 250, my translation). This is my main point: it works both ways. 
First, while it has been argued that “same-sex marriage” is part of what Lisa Duggan named 
in 2002 “the new homonormativity”, a crucial tenet in the “sexual politics of neoliberalism”, I 
believe that it is still worth arguing that the politics of recognition is also about redistribution. 
Indeed, in the age of #MeToo, it is worth recalling what may have been obscured by 
Catharine MacKinnon’s later struggles against pornography: the original argument of this 
feminist legal scholar about the sexual harassment of women at work is based on the idea that 
violence against women is not purely symbolic; not only does it affect bodies, but it is also an 
essential part of the economic domination of women – through “horizontal segregation” and 
“vertical stratification.” (MacKinnon, 1979). Sexual harassment is both symbolic and 
material, in the double sense of physical and economic. 
Conversely, the politics of redistribution is also about recognition. This second, crucial 
element is often overlooked because of the focus on the first one: as the descendants of the 
New Left have long been on the defensive, as we try to justify that our concerns are not 
“merely cultural”. I believe it is now time to reverse the perspective and focus, not on the 
cultural, but on the economic – not on minorities, but on class. My point can be summarized 
by a twist on Butler’s title: “merely economic”? I argue that class oppression is very much 
about recognition. It may not always have been true; but it is essential that we should 
understand it in this era of neoliberalism, which is also the age of populism. 
Think of the “yellow vests”. While the interpretation of this movement that has agitated 
France since late 2018 is both complex and contested, there is no doubt that it is both about 
redistribution and recognition. While it started as a movement of mostly working-class 
Whites against taxes on gas that weigh most on those who, far from city centers, depend on 
their cars to go to work, the fluorescent color of the men and women mobilized on 
roundabouts is a symbolic attempt to reclaim visibility by those who claim to be an invisible 
majority of “the people”. This explains in part the Macron administration’s difficulty in 
dealing with this social movement. Without recognition, redistribution will not do; the 
symbolic violence is thus duplicated by the physical repression, all the more so since neither 
the President nor the Prime Minister acknowledge police brutality – as if the wounded 
demonstrators remained politically invisible. 
It is all the more important to take seriously this convergence of the cultural and the economic 
if we want to understand the political success of right-wing populists such as Donald Trump 
(Fassin, 2017, especially 49-57)2. We know that he owes his 2016 election to his xenophobic, 
racist, and sexist discourse. We also know that, contrary to what many believe, he did not 
prevail among the working-class – indeed, even among White voters, there is no correlation 
between class and the Trump vote. But what about his clear victory among “Whites without a 
college degree”? Are we to understand that they were fooled by false promises of 
redistribution? If so, how come we suspect that the very same might vote again for him? In 
order to understand this, we need to take recognition into account. These uneducated voters 
“feel recognized, valorized, appreciated as White men. The depreciation of foreigners, 
women, and minorities, is the other side of their appreciation: their value becomes greater as 
that of others becomes lesser.” (Fassin, 2019, 121-129, quotation 126, my translation).  
Neoliberalism is about value – not just capital, but also human capital; not just one’s bank 
account, but also one’s own worth. This resonates with feminist arguments, at least since 
Virginia Woolf’s “A Room of One’s Own.” But the same goes for race: it is inseparably 
                                                        
2  Translation forthcoming with Prickly Paradigm : Populism Left and Right. See also exit polls: 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/11/08/us/politics/election-exit-polls.html  
economic and cultural as Black Lives Matter understands all too well. Here let us take the 
example of the persecution of the Roma in neoliberal Europe today: why should this minority 
be the target of intense campaigns, even in countries such as France where Roma migrants 
from Romania and Bulgaria have never exceeded 20,000? Because their poverty makes them 
potent symbols in a neoliberal world; by contrast to them, everyone has at least some form of 
worth. Race is about worth – worthiness and worthlessness. Value is relative as valuation is 
comparative: even Blacks and Arabs in France can feel appreciated, by contrast to the Roma, 
if only by contributing to their depreciation (Fassin et als., 2014, 58 ss.). 
Neoliberalism is not just traditional capitalism to a higher degree. This is why we have to take 
Fraser’s call for historicization a step further. For this, I rely on Michel Feher’s fundamental 
analysis of financial capitalism: today’s world is not so much about profit any longer; it is 
about credit (Feher, 2018). What is true about business and government is also true about 
individuals and social movements. This is how we can interpret what has unfolded in the last 
few years: “At odds with the Left populist strategy that wishes to convert white male rage 
against women, minorities, and foreigners into righteous indignation directed at 
unaccountable elites, Black Lives Matter, #MeToo, and the March for Our Lives 
unapologetically speculate against the various facets of the “citizenship value” that Donald 
Trump promised to raise.” (ibidem, 228). There are alternative ways of valuating lives – 
appreciating and depreciating them: this is what such movements have to say against racism, 
sexism, and the culture of violence. 
This implies that new social movements can and must indeed recuperate the neoliberal logic 
of credit for their own ends, thus turning upside down the capitalist recuperations of cultural 
politics. “In a word, far from sacrificing substance to symbolism or concentrating on 
symptoms to the detriment of structural inequalities, these movements reckon with the fact 
that the allocation of moral, social, and financial credit has become the decisive stake of 
social struggles.”(ibid, 229). Redefining what is worthwhile, namely, imposing new 
definitions of worth, is what politics is about today – both for neofascists like Trump and Jair 
Bolsonaro and for emancipatory social movements, whether class-based or not. Is it not time 
to take seriously the fact that neoliberalism is not “merely economic”? I argue, along with 
Feher, that the struggle against capitalism, in a neoliberal age, cannot afford to leave out 
culture. The cultural is not just an addition to the economic; it is an essential component of 
inequalities, and a crucial ingredient in their making. 
Insurgence, betrayal and resurgence: is the feminist history a drama? 
By BARBARA POGGIO 
 
What is the trajectory of the women’s liberation movement from the 1970s to the present? 
What has happened to its radical and critical push against the patriarchal system and its 
struggle to promote social and political change? And which spaces are opening up in the 
present and in the future for feminist action and practice? These questions are the common 
thread of “Fortunes of Feminism. From State-Managed Capitalism to Neoliberal Crisis”, 
published in 2013 by one of the most famous and influential exponents of American critical 
feminism, Nancy Fraser. The volume retraces the trajectory of second-wave feminism, 
starting from a series of contributions written by the author over several decades, and 
engaging in a dialogue with some of the major voices of critical theory and post-structuralism 
like Habermas, Foucault, and Butler. 
In order to trace the history of second-wave feminism, Fraser chose to adopt the narrative 
device of a drama in three acts. In the first act, feminism expresses its radical criticism to the 
welfare state, highlighting the women’s subjugation. In the second, in the context of a 
weakening of the struggles for redistribution, the cultural dimension of recognition becomes 
increasingly relevant, in a process of progressive convergence with the neoliberal agenda. 
And finally, in the third and final act -temporally set in the present - Fraser identifies the 
space and the possibility for a resurgence of radical feminism, in light of the crisis of liberal 
capitalism. 
Very rich and dense, Fraser’s book offers countless solicitations to the debate on feminism, 
and interacts with other debates, including in particular those on social justice, on the 
implications of globalization and on the affirmation of neoliberalism. In these pages, I would 
like to recall first what I believe to be the key points of Fraser’s narrative, and subsequently 
focus on some of the issues prompted by the reading.  
As previously said, Fraser’s volume retraces the history of second-wave feminism by 
adopting a three-act structure, which in some ways recalls the circular structure of the 
Hegelian dialectic.  
The story begins with the emergence and affirmation of second-wave feminism in the 1970s. 
At the heart of the essays collected in the first act we find a critical reading of the welfare 
state, where the major implications - in terms of social order management - and their limits 
are highlighted from a feminist viewpoint. Fraser shows how the second-wave feminist 
movement, along with other radical currents, fought to transform society by challenging 
gender injustice and the androcentrism behind the post-World War II capitalist and welfare 
models . 
The opening thesis deals with the inability of the thinkers of the Frankfurt School, including 
Habermas, to identify and problematize the gender implications of that model of governance. 
The focus on the figure of the (white) breadwinner, the “family wage” system and the 
complementarity of women’s unpaid reproductive and care work, the lack of problematization 
of domestic violence, the tendency to favor the rhetoric of needs rather than that of rights, the 
stigmatization of female dependency are some of the major shortcomings feminism initially 
addresses in its protests and claims. 
In the second act, however, we witness a sort of betrayal (the antithesis) of the instances that 
had characterized the previous phase. The critical momentum that had pushed the movement 
in the first act is running out and feminism seems to be experiencing a phase of 
“domestication”. Leaving behind the economic criticism and the demands for social 
redistribution and equality, it now turns its attention to issues of recognition, identity, 
promotion of difference and specificity. The roots of this twist are found in the influence of 
French post-structuralism, and Lacanism in particular. While acknowledging the merit of 
these theoretical perspectives in highlighting the discursive construction of gender identities, 
Fraser looks with concern at the possible divergence - in both political analysis and practice - 
between the material and the symbolic dimension, and, more importantly, the risk that 
identities might come to be seen as monolithic and determinist systems - which means 
reifying and sclerotizing them - or as atomized and self-creating forms, which means 
dissolving them altogether. 
However, the main concern remains the (involuntary?) convergence between the identitarian 
and cultural twist of the feminist movement and the affirmation of the neoliberal design: 
according to Fraser some of the core principles of the first phase of second-wave feminism 
(i.e. economic criticism and opposition to androcentrism and statism) have been subjected to a 
process of resignification that transformed them into forms of legitimation of the neoliberal 
order. 
Lastly, the third act, set in contemporary times (perhaps more as a hope than as a mere 
description of the reality), in a moment when the crisis of neoliberalism carries along the 
opportunity to give new life to the promises of feminism. Now is time for a synthesis that 
brings together redistribution and recognition through the introduction of a third dimension - 
that is, representation - more purely political, thus foreshadowing a new alliance with social 
protection. 
This is, of course, just a brief summary of the much denser and deeper narrative that Nancy 
Fraser offers us of the history of second-wave feminism. I would like to recall some of the 
numerous insights offered by Fraser’s book, focusing on the ones that have been sources of 
doubt or puzzlement for me, in the interest of making this opportunity for dialogue more 
fruitful. 
Nancy Fraser’s reflections on feminism and gender asymmetries have always been deeply 
linked to her idea of social justice. Through the reconstruction she proposed in her book, we 
can, in fact, see a cumulative process of elaboration on this concept and its articulations. She 
starts by focusing on redistribution - the topic that characterizes the first act of the history of 
second-wave feminism - on the basis of a critical vision of society’s economic and class 
structure, of the division of labor, and of the asymmetrical access to resources and services. 
From this perspective, she wonders what constitutes an equitable distribution of material 
resources. In the next step a “bifocal” vision is adopted by focusing attention - on a more 
cultural ground - on the recognition of status, rights, identities, and differences: now the 
question is who should be included or excluded from the social and political community. This 
is a vital question in the debate on the recognition of minorities (as in the LGBTQ 
movements) or on multiculturalism. These two dimensions are, according to Fraser, 
analytically distinct and relatively independent, though they usually coexist and might 
mutually reinforce each other. Ultimately, the third step leads to a three-dimensional 
configuration: in addition to the economic and cultural dimensions, the third act introduces 
the political dimension of representation - that is, how the boundaries of political action and 
opposition are defined- which is, in fact, the necessary condition for claiming and obtaining 
the first two: there is no redistribution nor recognition without representation. 
It is only by actualizing these dimensions that we can achieve participatory parity and actually 
create a society in which the legitimation of the demands of recognition does not occur at the 
expense of economic justice. However, it is not entirely clear how this final synthesis can 
actually be achieved - assuming it is, in fact, a synthesis - and may require further reflection, 
particularly in the light of the current developments in global and local politics and their 
implications in terms of social justice, not only on the ground of gender, but also, for instance, 
in terms of migration, job insecurity, and generational inequalities. 
The second issue I would like to draw attention to arises from Fraser’s take on the relationship 
between second-wave feminism and neoliberal capitalism. “Dangerous liaison”, “disturbing 
convergence”, “assimilation” are some of the expressions she uses to describe the problematic 
stances of second-wave feminism in regard to the establishment of post-Fordist capitalism. 
Fraser argues that some of the feminism’s most critical positions - in opposition to the 
androcentrism and paternalism of the welfare state, to the family wage, and to the exclusion 
of women from the public space typical of the Fordist and Keynesian model - have indeed 
contributed to the weakening of the welfare state, and facilitated the affirmation of the 
neoliberal order and its resulting phenomena: job insecurity, lower wages, and declining 
living standards. 
From this perspective, then, feminism would have been - more or less inadvertently - a 
fundamental ally of neoliberalism, complicit in the consolidation of the new paradigms of 
accumulation, and in an ancillary position that favored the affirmation of new market models 
that are as unbalanced as the previous ones. However, even though it is undeniable that in 
some cases – like that of the academic context, where actions aimed at promoting women’s 
role in positions of power have leaned on the neoliberal policies of performance enhancement 
and meritocracy (Poggio, 2018) -, Fraser’s vision of feminism appears to be perhaps 
excessively severe and trenchant. 
On the one hand, the risk is to underestimate dynamics that are physiological to every 
movement that becomes institutionalized. As a matter of fact, institutionalization always - and 
inevitably - coincides with the de-escalation of the critical and anti-systemic thrust of the 
movements (Della Porta and Diani 2006). In this sense, it is not accidental that today’s most 
radical feminism finds new lymph right when many of its achievements are at risk once again. 
At the same time, as Sylvia Walby (2011) notes, neoliberalism actually makes feminists’ 
goals harder to achieve, for it increases social inequality and reduces democracy. For Walby, 
there is no actual evidence that the feminist movements welcomed neoliberalism, but instead 
was neoliberalism that instrumentally used some of their principles. But this does not 
necessarily imply actual complicity or collusion. And it is therefore ungenerous to criticize 
feminism as instrumentally represented by neoliberals. However, this brings us to a further 
issue, that is, what we actually mean when we say “feminism”. 
Nancy Fraser’s narrative of second-wave feminism suggests the idea of a homogeneous 
movement that goes through three main stages: at first engaged in a liberation struggle against 
the gender system of the Fordist society, then progressively focused on identitarian and 
cultural claims that partially coincide with the objectives of neoliberal capitalism - by which 
feminism is co-opted - and finally got ready to reclaim the radical nature of its origins, in the 
light of the awareness gradually acquired. What we are told here is fundamentally the story of 
a single collective subject that reacts to the changes in the socio-economic context, risks 
losing its direction and finally finds its way again. On the one hand, however, this three-phase 
articulation and the negative connotation given to the second one might be simplifying a 
process that is actually much more nuanced and erratic. Feminism, the original one, emerges 
from the second act as a weakened and paralyzed subject facing a neoliberalism that is so 
powerful it can resignify its ideals, mobilizing its “double”, a corrupted and co-opted version, 
that is, the neoliberal feminism (Ferguson 2017). 
On the other hand, Fraser presents a rather skinny representation of feminism, whose story is 
in reality much more articulated, as suggested by the many analytical contributions that over 
time have provided maps and typologies of feminism, highlighting that feminism does not 
come in a single form but rather in many different ones. From early liberal feminism to 
socialist feminism, black and post-colonial feminism, psychoanalytical feminism, difference 
feminism, post-structuralist, and post-modern feminism, many are the categorizations used to 
describe feminists’ different stances and interpretative viewpoints (Calás and Smircich, 1996, 
Lorber, 1997). The feminist movements born in the 1970s, in particular, have always been 
multi-stranded, often divided within themselves and with different points of view on the type 
of world they were fighting for. Not to forget the most recent and controversial 
phenomenologies, such as market feminism (Kantola and Squires, 2012) or postfeminism (Mc 
Robbie, 2004). An array so rich and heterogeneous in expressions that is difficult to ascribe to 
a single trajectory. 
Lastly, there is a final issue I would like to draw attention to, which is related to Fraser’s 
account of the so-called “cultural turn”. In her book, as we have seen, Fraser tries to highlight 
the challenges and risks associated with the affirmation of a feminism centered on cultural 
issues and on identity politics. Main references of the two are found, on the one hand, in the 
difference feminism (Kristeva) and, on the other, in the postmodern gender theory (Butler). 
Actually, these two expressions of feminism are very distant, I would say almost antithetical 
to some extent, nonetheless they are ascribed to a common “cultural” genesis on the grounds 
that in both cases the focus shifted from the material and structural dimension of sexual 
inequality to the symbolic and discursive dimension of identity and difference. Here it is 
perhaps possible to grasp an ambivalence in Fraser’s reasoning: if, on the one hand, the 
author’s proximity to the critical and structuralist approach is evident, on the other she 
recognizes the potential of discourse theory for the purposes of a politics of resistance. Such 
potential largely arises from recognizing that gender is a “discursive construction”. The 
different opportunities that women and men encounter in their social experiences cannot, in 
fact, be explained on the basis of biological diversity. Instead, they result from processes of 
identification and socialization that are largely enabled through discourses and that refers to a 
specific symbolic order, which Lacan defined as the “Law of the Father”. Fraser, however, 
fears the essentialist and deterministic drifts of these developments, and their inability to give 
account of the complexity and instability of identities and transformations linked to practices, 
experiences and collective actions. In my view this reconstruction perhaps tends to 
oversimplify and polarize the reality. I would like to mention here that many contributions - in 
the field of feminist sociological research of recent decades, and mainly organizational studies 
- have tried to overcome the dichotomy between the material/structural and the 
symbolic/discursive dimensions by adopting the concept of social practice, and by looking at 
gender as a situated and practical accomplishment, in which individual agency and social 
structure intertwine (Connell, 1987; Poggio, 2004). Such a perspective can be particularly 
useful in order to deconstruct and change the existing hegemonic structures. Taking into 
greater account these and other approaches – such as intersectional theory - that over the last 
few decades have been elaborating on feminism, by developing reflections that are certainly 
inspired by a cultural matrix, but have also made the effort to go beyond culturalist 
reductionism, could add a further piece to the precious work of systematization and re-
elaboration of feminist contribution hitherto made by Nancy Fraser. 
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A lot has happened since I published Fortunes of Feminism in 2013. At that time, the 
structural impasses of financialized capitalism were already generating palpable effects: 
precarized work, ballooning debt, financial meltdown; de-democratization, political gridlock, 
intensified violence; exacerbated stresses on climate, communities, care. But it was only after 
the book’s appearance that people began defecting overtly and en masse from a system in 
crisis. Trump and Sanders, Podemos and Brexit, Bolsonaro and AMLO–all are signposts of an 
ongoing process, as capital’s victims slough off establishment commonsense and begin 
thinking outside the box–for better and worse. Today, in other words, the objective blockages 
of the previous period are acquiring a subjective face. The crisis of financialized capitalism is 
now no longer “merely” structural but also hegemonic. 
An integral part of this political shift, feminism is transforming as well. Liberal 
corporate feminism, heretofore dominant, is losing its credibility along with the larger 
progressive neoliberal bloc to which it belongs. No longer able to represent feminism as such, 
the lean-in crowd, pant-suited advocates of equal-opportunity domination, are increasingly 
thrust aside by new generations of militant feminists–anti-racist and ecological, pro-working-
class and anti-austerity, anti-imperialist and internationalist, anti-neoliberal and often 
anticapitalist. These activists organize massive strikes and demos, while proliferating radical 
hashtags: #NosotrasParamos, #WeStrike, #VivasNosQueremos, #NiUnaMenos, #TimesUp, 
and #Feminism4the99. Rejecting gender identitarianism, they embrace wide 
(“intersectionalist”) views of what counts as a feminist issue. Eschewing political separatism, 
they propose to join with other, like-minded emancipatory movements in a broad-based 
global insurgency. Spurning both progressive neoliberalism and reactionary populism, they 
militate to transform society root and branch.  
Certainly, these developments alter the picture I sketched in the preface to Fortunes of 
Feminism. But they don’t seem to me to invalidate it. They begin, rather, to put some flesh on 
the bare bones of what I there dubbed “act three,” an account which, as Barbara Poggio 
rightly notes, appeared more as hope than social fact. Alternatively, depending on how things 
unfold, they might even herald a fourth act, as Jo Littler suggests. Without question, they 
embody that mix of demands and aims (“redistribution,” “recognition,” “representation”’; 
material, symbolic, practical) that Eric Fassin–indeed, all the contributors–advocate. It’s early 
days, of course, and things could still end badly. But the plot I outlined in Fortunes of 
Feminism has definitely thickened.  
These developments cast new light on Barbara Poggio’s excellent question: how can 
feminists create a project that “synthesizes” redistribution, recognition and representation 
today? An answer appears in the new feminisms I just described. What enables them to hold 
those seemingly fractious aims together is anticapitalism: a perspective that posits a single, 
overarching social system that non-accidentally generates massive injustices of several major 
types (economic, cultural, political, social-reproductive and ecological), along several 
entrenched social faultlines (gender, class, race; sexuality, age, nationality), and at several 
different scales (global, national, transnational; the city, the “terroir,” the habitat, the planet). 
It was a version of this assumption, that the vast catalogue of injustices we experience is no 
mere miscellany, but the differentiated fallout from one and the same social system, that gave 
women’s liberation of the New Left era its radical, capacious thrust. It is this assumption, too, 
that faded with the rise of neoliberalism, allowing the “economic” and the “cultural” to 
diverge; no longer held together in a common societal matrix, those dimensions of justice 
could be isolated from one another and posed as mutually antithetical. It is this assumption, 
finally, that radical feminists of the present are now rediscovering. Granted, young activists 
may be vague as to what exactly capitalism is, how precisely it gestates its multiple harms, 
and what specifically is required to effectively contest it. But their intuition is sound and 
affords real insight: the sense of a common enemy, the orientation to solidarity, and the thirst 
for broad visions and powerful alliances–all essential ingredients of a counterhegemony.  
This point deepens my diagnosis of what went wrong in “Act Two.” I can endorse 
Poggio’s view that social movements have “lifecycles,” provided we see these as unfolding 
historically, not naturally. What deradicalized feminism was not age-related energy loss, but 
its fateful convergence with financialized capitalism. The latter succeeded in resignifying 
some of the movement’s signature memes for its own legitimation. In insisting on this point, I 
am not primarily interested in apportioning blame–although there’s no denying that there 
were, and still are, powerful corporate, state and global femocrats who warmly embrace these 
developments. My point is rather to clarify the process by which neoliberal hegemony was 
constructed–in part by coopting feminism’s emancipatory charisma. For me, accordingly, 
appeals to the plurality of “different feminisms” only get us so far. I take it as self-evident that 
Black feminists, socialist and Marxist feminists (including me!), and others steadfastly 
opposed neoliberalization throughout it rise. But as Littler notes, we lacked the heft to dictate 
the movement’s overall trajectory. And I insist that there really is an overall trajectory–one in 
which liberal feminism became hegemonic at the expense of more, radical competing 
currents. Thus, I reject both options proffered by Poggio: neither one single feminism nor 
many; rather, a struggle for hegemony. 
This perspective also affords some answers to points raised by Eric Fassin. His 
admonitions to combine redistribution and recognition, economy and culture, come straight 
from my own playbook. The nub of our difference is not that agenda but how to 
operationalize it today–above all, how to understand and contest neoliberalism. For Fassin, 
following Feher, neoliberalism is a total worldview, comprising not only a political-economic 
perspective but also its own specific schemas of value and worth. For me, by contrast, as 
Littler notes, neoliberalism is a flexible political-economic module, which articulates to a 
variety of different schemas of recognition and cultural value. Assuming a Gramscian lens, 
we can distinguish Modi’s Hindu-nationalist neoliberalism, Iranian theocracy’s Shi’ite 
neoliberalism, Saudi Salafist neoliberalism, Macron’s diversity-chic technocratic 
neoliberalism, Bolsonaro’s hardline macho-militarist neoliberalism, and Trump’s bad-boy 
hyper-reactionary neoliberalism, among many others. In each case, a neoliberal political-
economic project articulates with a different cultural ethos and politics of recognition. These 
differences matter both in themselves and for efforts to build a counterhegemony. If we fail to 
reckon with neoliberal opportunism, its remarkable ability to shape-shift, we risk being taken 
in and hegemonized by it.  
This is exactly what happened in the period I stylized in Fortunes of Feminism as “act 
two.” As I see it, Fassin underestimates the degree to which progressive recognition politics 
(feminist and otherwise) became unmoored from egalitarian redistributive politics and got 
recuperated within the progressive-neoliberal bloc that ruled much of North America and 
Western Europe until quite recently. As a result, he may be inclined to miss analogous traps 
being laid in the present: for example, the current campaign by progressive-neoliberal 
politicians to convince feminists (and others) to abandon risky “far-left” projects and return to 
the liberal fold, which alone (so they claim) can protect us from the racist-misogynist Right. 
They neglect to mention, of course, that the status quo ante is precisely what spawned that 
Right. In my view, the only way to defeat the latter is to win over its winnable fractions to a 
project that combines progressive recognition with egalitarian redistribution. In the US, this 
means following the Sanders strategy of building an alliance between pro-working-class 
fractions of the new social movements and those Trump voters whose racism was 
opportunistic as opposed to “principled”–i.e., those who voted for Obama in 2008 and 2012 
and for Sanders in the 2016 Democratic Party primaries before casting their lot with Trump in 
the general election. My hope is that they, like the Yellow Vests invoked by Fassin, can be 
induced to combine demands for egalitarian redistribution with forms of recognition that do 
not rest on the depreciation of others.  
On most of these points, Jo Littler and I are agreed. But she raises several trenchant 
questions, which deserve better answers than I can give here. Are some variants of what I call 
“reactionary neoliberalism” not really neoliberal at all?  What about parties that oppose 
austerity, favor generous social provision, promise to create manufacturing jobs and claim to 
preserve national greenery, while opposing immigration, stigmatizing minorities, and 
purveying ethnonational chauvinism? Are these not better categorized as reactionary 
populists, ethnonational social democrats, supporters of eco-apartheid, or perhaps even 
(proto-)fascists? Certainly, there exist parties that campaign vigorously in such terms. Once in 
power, however, they tend to make their peace with Wall Street and the WTO. Clearly, that’s 
been the case with Trump, who has ditched his economic populist promises, while doubling 
down on racist scapegoating. But of course, reactionary-populist regimes are possible in 
principle–and may still emerge in reality. In that event, leftwing feminists will need to craft a 
different strategy.  
Littler also raises the pressing problem of climate change, which must be an integral 
part of the anticapitalist feminist project. On this point, we have much to learn from the 
women of the Global South: for example, the Water Protectors’ fight against the Dakota 
Access Pipeline in the United States, Máxima Acuña’s successful battle in Peru against the 
US mining giant Newmont, the North India Garhwali women who are fighting against the 
construction of three hydroelectric dams, those struggling across the globe against the 
privatization of water and seed and for the preservation of biodiversity and sustainable 
farming. In these cases, activists are modeling new, integrated forms of struggle that 
challenge the tendency of mainstream environmentalists to frame the defense of “nature” and 
the material well-being of human communities as antithetical. Refusing to separate ecological 
issues from issues of social reproduction, these women-led movements represent a powerful 
anti-corporate and anticapitalist alternative to “green capitalism.” Unlike the latter, they 
address a world in which social justice, the well-being of human communities, and the 
sustainability of nonhuman nature are inextricably bound up together. They show us that 
liberation of women and the preservation of our planet from ecological disaster go hand in 
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